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Quantum random number generators (QRNGs) can provide genuine randomness based on the
inherent unpredictable nature of quantum physics. The extracted randomness relies not only on
the physical parts of the QRNG, such as the entropy source and the measurement device, but
also on appropriate postprocessing method. The m-least significant bits (m-LSBs) operation is one
of the simplest randomness extraction method, which has the advantage of easy implementations.
Nonetheless, a detailed analysis of the m-LSBs operation in QRNGs is still missing. In this work we
give a physical explanation of the m-LSBs operation by introducing a new positive operator-valued
measurement operator, which is obtained by regrouping the results of coarse-grained measurements.
Both trusted and untrusted source scenarios are discussed. The results show that the m-LSBs
operation can extract randomness effectively under the condition of the trusted source, while it is
not effective under the untrusted source scenario.
I. INTRODUCTION
Random numbers are widely used in many fields, in-
cluding numerical simulations [1], statistical analysis [2],
fundamental physics tests [3], and cryptography [4]. Tra-
ditionally, pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs),
which are based on deterministic computational algo-
rithms aiming at expending a short random seed into a
longer random sequence, are adopted to generate random
bits in extensive applications. The randomness generated
from PRNGs is determined by the short random seed,
thus any random numbers generated by algorithms can-
not be truly random even if the sequence appears “ran-
dom”. However in some fields like cryptography, where
the unpredictable feature of the random numbers is of
great importance, PRNGs cannot meet the requirements
of implementations.
In contrast, quantum random number generators
(QRNGs) [5–7] can provide information-theoretical prov-
able random numbers, which are in principle unpre-
dictable and irreproducible based on the intrinsic un-
predictable nature of quantum physics, thus they have
attracted much attentions in recent years. In general, a
QRNG can be divided into four parts: the randomness
source (also called the entropy source), the measurement
device, the postprocessing process, and the randomness
test. The process of generating quantum random num-
bers can be described as follows [5, 6]: An entropy source
is prepared in a superposition of the measurement states,
and a measurement operator is performed on the pre-
pared states. The measurement outcomes are intrinsi-
cally unpredictable according to Born’s rule. However, a
perfect state preparation with an ideal measurement is
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always a difficult task in experiment, leading to the gen-
eration of the random numbers not being able to reach
the ideal case. Therefore, the postprocessing step needs
to be performed.
According to the requirements of the physical devices,
QRNGs can be classified into tree different types [5],
namely, full-trusted-device, semi-device-independent and
full-device-independent QRNGs.
In trusted-device QRNG scenarios, schemes of various
entropy sources have been demonstrated, including pho-
ton spatial modes [8–10] and temporal modes [11–16],
photon number distribution [17, 18], phase noise of lasers
[19–26], quadrature fluctuation of vacuum noise [27–29],
amplified spontaneous noise [30–35] and so forth, which
assume that all the device models are fully characterized
to pursue a high generation rate. However, in practical,
the devices are always interacted with the environment,
resulting in the hard calibrations of them. Even worse,
the devices may leak side information to potential adver-
saries, leading to a better prediction of random numbers.
This case is sometimes called untrusted-device scenario.
To deal with the scenario of untrusted devices, self-
testing QRNGs [36], e.g. device-independent (DI)
QRNGs [37, 38], were proposed to generate genuine ran-
domness without perfectly characterising the practical
instruments, and therefore, the output randomness does
not rely on any assumptions about the physical devices.
Despite today’s experimental techniques make the speed
of DI-QRNGs a tremendous progress [39–41], it is still
hard to fulfil people’s needs in many fields. As a compro-
mise, the semi-device-independent QRNG offers a good
trade-off between the performance of the trusted-device
QRNG and the security of the DI-QRNG, thus this
scheme has great potential. The secure random num-
bers can be generated by trusting partial devices of the
QRNG, while the assumptions of other devices are re-
2moved. In general, there are two main branches of semi-
device-independent QRNGs: one is the measurement-
device-independent QRNG [42–44], and the alternative
is the source-device-independent (SDI) QRNG [45–48].
Nevertheless, only good-quality entropy sources and
well-characterized detectors are not enough for a QRNG.
The postprocessing procedure is necessary due to the fol-
lowing two reasons: randomness extracted from the envi-
ronment needs to be eliminated and uniform randomness
from the randomness source needs to be extracted. The
postprocessing process generally includes the entropy es-
timation phase and the randomness extraction phase
[49]. The entropy estimation phase tells us how many
uniform random bits can be extracted at most in the
raw data (the random sequences without postprocessing)
with distribution X , namely the min-entropy H∞ (X) in
trusted-device scenarios and the conditional min-entropy
H∞ (X |E) in untrusted-device scenarios. The random-
ness extraction step aims at using extractors to distill
(almost) uniform randomness based on the entropy esti-
mation phase.
There are two categories of extractors: deterministic
extractors and seeded extractors. Deterministic extrac-
tors are functions taking input n-bits strings into shorter
outputm-bits strings. Some simple postprocessing meth-
ods have been widely used in QRNGs, such as them-least
significant bits (m-LSBs) operation [19, 29, 50, 51], the
logical exclusive-OR operation [20], the von Neumann
debiasing method [17] and so forth. They are charming
for the simple algorithms which are easy to implement in
both hardware and software implementations, and thus
suitable for the high-speed and real-time scenarios. They
also have the advantage that the procedures do not need
pre-prepared random seeds to work, which are sometimes
limited resources in the real-life realizations. The alter-
native seeded extractors are functions inputing n-bits raw
data and k-bits uniform random seeds and producing m-
bits random sequences. The superiority of seeded ex-
tractors is that the extracted randomness of them can be
proved as information-theoretical-provable randomness,
e.g. Toeplitz-hashing [52, 53] and Trevisan’s [54, 55] ex-
tractors. Nonetheless, the rather low speeds [49] and the
complex structures restrict the applications especially in
the real-time implementations.
In this paper, we focus on the most simple extractors:
deterministic extractors, especially on the m-LSBs op-
erations, which are still lacking of a detailed analysis in
QNRGs (which were only discussed in Ref.[29] to our
knowledge). We analyze the relationship between the
data before and after the postprocessing procedure and
then construct operators of the m-LSBs operations to
avoid sophisticated mathematical discussions. The two
main contributions of this work can be summarized as
follows:
(1) We restrict our discussions on the coherent-
detection (homodyne or heterodyne detection) types of
QRNGs, and build new positive operator-valued mea-
surement (POVM) operators of the m-LSBs operations.
(2) We apply the POVM operators to analyse the per-
formances of m-LSBs operators in both trusted source
and untrusted source scenarios. The entropy estimation
steps are performed by acting the new operators on quan-
tum states in the trusted source scenario and construct-
ing a new entropic uncertainty relation (EUR) in the un-
trusted source scenario, respectively.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec.II,
we build new POVM operators of the m-LSBs opera-
tion. Then, we analyse the performances of the m-LSBs
operations in both trusted source scenario (Sec.III) and
untrusted source scenario (Sec.IV), followed by a discus-
sion in Sec.V. Finally, a summary of the paper is given
in Sec.VI.
II. THE POVM OPERATOR OF THE m-LSBS
OPERATION
In this section, we restrict our discussion on the QRNG
schemes with coherent detection, which are one of the
promising continuous-variable QRNG techniques [6] and
they have the advantages of the high generation rates and
easy to implement with “off-the-shelf” detectors. First,
we review the coarse-grained position-momentum mea-
surements introduced by the finite precision and finite
range of detectors. Then we analyse the feature of the
coarse-grained measurement intervals and recombine the
measurement intervals according to the data’s character-
istics after the m-LSBs operation. Last but not least, we
define new m-LSBs operators based on the recombined
intervals.
The general structure of the practical (homodyne)
detection and the m-LSBs postprocessing operation in
QRNGs are shown in Fig.1. A practical homodyne de-
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FIG. 1. (Color online) The general structure of the measure-
ment and the m-LSBs postprocessing procedure in QRNGs.
A practical homodyne detector is modelled by an ideal ho-
modyne detector followed by a practical ADC with sampling
range from −α to α and L is the digitized bits. The data after
the m-LSBs operation can be recombined into new intervals.
Here we choose L = 3 and m = 2 as an example.
3tector is always modeled by an ideal homodyne detector
followed by a practical analog-to-digital converter (ADC)
with finite sampling range and resolution. In the most
basic scenario, the randomness source ρ is measured by
an ideal homodyne detection to get results X , which
can be described by the projection operators Mˆx and
Nˆp (x, p ∈ (−∞,+∞)):
Mˆx = |x〉 〈x| , Nˆp = |p〉 〈p| , (1)
where
∫
x
|x〉 〈x|dx = 1 and ∫
p
|p〉 〈p|dp = 1 are the nor-
malization conditions. After measuring the quantum
state, the measurement results need to be discretized,
since practical scenarios are always performed with finite
precisions. Considering that a practical ADC with finite
sampling range (assuming the sampling range is from −α
to α) and resolution (assuming the digitized bits is L) is
used for discretizing quadrature X , and the precision is
δx =
2α
2L = α2
−L+1. The measurement outcomes can be
grouped into intervals {Ii}, given by [56]

Ii = (−∞,−α] i = 0
Ii = (−α+ (i− 1) δx,−α+ iδx] , i ∈
[
1, 2L
]
Ii = (α,+∞) i = 2L+1
(2)
Therefore the ideal homodyne detection together with
the discretization processes formally corresponds to
2L + 2 POVM operators
{
Mˆ iδx
}
with elements Mˆ iδx =∫
Ii
dx |x〉 〈x|, (i ∈ [0, 2L + 1]). The outcome X iD after
the discretization process appears with the probability
of Pr
(
X iD
)
= Tr
(
ρMˆ iδx
)
. Noting that in experiment the
value of X0D is always treated as the same value of X
1
D,
and the value of X2
L+1
D is treated as the same value of
X2
L
D , since infinite intervals I0 and I2L+1 correspond to
the minimum and maximum values of the measurement
outcomes, respectively. The probabilities should verify
the normalization condition, i.e.,
∑
i Pr
(
X iD
)
= 1.
Due to the fact that the intervals I0 and I2L+1 are
with infinite lengths, and they do not correspond to new
measured values in the measurement results, leading to
different considerations in our following analysis under
different scenarios. Therefore, we define new discrete in-
tervals
{
I˜i
}
with same interval lengths, which satisfy
I˜i = (−α+ iδx,−α+ (i+ 1) δx] , i ∈
[
0, 2L − 1] , (3)
and discuss the effect of intervals I0 and I2L+1 separately.
In experiment, the alphabet of each interval
{
I˜i
}
is always mapped to a binary L-bits number, namely
X iD := a
(i)
L a
(i)
L−1...a
(i)
1 with a
(i)
m ∈ {0, 1}, which is easy to
be processed by the data processing. a
(i)
L and a
(i)
1 are
the most significant bit (MSB) and the LSB respectively
in Gray’s binary decomposition [57], and a
(i)
m a
(i)
m−1...a
(i)
1
denotes the m-LSBs.
The m-LSBs operation is a simple postprocessing
method which discards several k-MSBs in raw data and
remains the restm-LSBs, wherem+k = L, and then out-
puts the low m-bits sequences as the new random bits.
This data processing method often shows its effectiveness
for the randomness extraction in many scenarios, which
can remove the discretization intervals which do not con-
tribute to the final random streams and can uniform the
probability distribution of the output data. We give the
following examples to show the relations between the raw
data and the m-LSBs data (only consider data within in-
tervals
{
I˜i
}
):
(i) 1-LSB operation: If we only keep the LSB of the bi-
nary raw dataX iD and discard the other bits, the remain-
ing data is X i1−LSB := a
(i)
1 , which only has two outcomes,
1 or 0. Hence the new intervals {Γj} can be described
after recombining the previous intervals, which are given
by (i ∈ [0, 2L − 1]):
Γ0 =
{
I˜i|a(i)1 = 0
}
=
{
I˜i|i = 0, 2, · · · , 2L − 2
}
,
Γ1 =
{
I˜i|a(i)1 = 1
}
=
{
I˜i|i = 1, 3, · · · , 2L − 1
}
. (4)
The previous intervals where the LSB is equal to zero
are combined into a new interval Γ0 and the previous in-
tervals where the LSB is equal to one are combined into
a new interval Γ1. Hence a part of the POVM opera-
tors of the 1-LSB operation can be defined as (without
considering the infinite-length intervals)
Mˆ j1−LSB,δx =
{∫
Γj
dx |x〉 〈x|
}
j∈[0,1]
. (5)
(ii) 2-LSBs operation: If we keep the lowest two bits
of the binary raw data X iD and cut off the other bits, the
remaining data is X i2−LSBs := a
(i)
2 a
(i)
1 , and each bit has
two outcomes. The new intervals after regrouping the
data are given by (i ∈ [0, 2L − 1]):
Γ0 =
{
I˜i|a(i)2 a(i)1 = 00
}
=
{
I˜i|i ≡ 0 (mod 4)
}
,
Γ1 =
{
I˜i|a(i)2 a(i)1 = 01
}
=
{
I˜i|i ≡ 1 (mod 4)
}
,
Γ2 =
{
I˜i|a(i)2 a(i)1 = 10
}
=
{
I˜i|i ≡ 2 (mod 4)
}
,
Γ3 =
{
I˜i|a(i)2 a(i)1 = 11
}
=
{
I˜i|i ≡ 3 (mod 4)
}
, (6)
and a part of the POVM operators of the 2-LSBs opera-
tion can be written as
Mˆ j2−LSBs,δx =
{∫
Γj
dx |x〉 〈x|
}
j∈[0,3]
. (7)
(iii)m-LSBs operation: Similarly, if we keep the lowest
m bits and discard the other bits, the recombing intervals
after the m-LSBs operation are
4Γ0 =
{
I˜i|a(i)m ...a(i)1 = 0...0
}
,
Γ1 =
{
I˜i|a(i)m ...a(i)1 = 0...1
}
,
.....
Γ2m−2 =
{
I˜i|a(i)m ...a(i)1 = 1...0
}
,
Γ2m−1 =
{
I˜i|a(i)m ...a(i)1 = 1...1
}
. (8)
Therefore it is easy to define new discretized inter-
vals of the m-LSBs data, given by (i ∈ [0, 2L − 1] , j ∈
[0, 2m − 1])
Γj =
{
I˜i|i ≡ j (mod 2m)
}
, (9)
and a part of the POVM operators of the m-LSBs oper-
ation can be described, given by
Mˆ jm−LSBs,δx =
{∫
Γj
dx |x〉 〈x|
}
j∈[0,2m−1]
. (10)
Considering the infinite-length intervals, the over-
all POVM operators of m-LSBs operation (in the fol-
lowing paper we call them the m-LSBs operators)
are
{
Mˆ jm−LSBs,δx , Mˆ
∞
m−LSBs
}
(j ∈ [0, 2m − 1]), where
Mˆ∞m−LSBs = I −
∑
j Mˆ
j
m−LSBs,δx
stands for the event on
the outside of the detection range. For the convenience
of the follow-up discussions, we rewrite Eq.(10) as
Mˆ jm−LSBs,δx =
2L−m−1∑
i=0
∫ (j+2mi+1)δx
(j+2mi)δx
dx |x〉 〈x|, (11)
where j ∈ [0, 2m − 1]. Likewise, the s-LSBs operators for
measuring quadrature P can be written as
Nˆ js−LSBs,δp =
2N−s−1∑
i=0
∫ (j+2si+1)δp
(j+2si)δp
dp |p〉 〈p|,
Nˆ∞s−LSBs,δp = I−
∑
j
Nˆ js−LSBs,δp (12)
where j ∈ [0, 2s − 1] and N is the number of discretiza-
tion bits for quadrature P .
III. TRUSTED SOURCE SCENARIO
In the trusted source scenario, it is always assumed
that the source can be well characterized and the tech-
nical noises cannot be accessible to the potential adver-
saries. In this case, one can ensure that the measurement
is always within the range [−α, α] by adjusting the range
of ADCs, and the probabilities of the infinite-length in-
tervals I0 and I2L+1 (denoted by Tr
(
ρMˆ∞m−LSBs
)
) are
small, which do not have the contributions for the min-
entropy in generating random bits and thus can be ne-
glected. The probabilities of measuring each interval in
{Γj} are given by
Pr
(
Xjm−LSBs
)
= Tr
(
ρMˆ jm−LSBs,δx
)
, (13)
and the min-entropy is defined as [58]
H∞ (xM ) = −log2
(
max
j∈[0,2m−1]
Pr
(
Xjm−LSBs
))
, (14)
where xM stands for the measurement results. The min-
entropy corresponds to the maximum guessing probabil-
ity for an adversary about Xjm−LSBs, and it is also known
as the maximum (almost) uniform randomness which can
be extracted out of the distribution Pr
(
Xjm−LSBs
)
.
In the case of measuring vacuum state with homodyne
detection [27–29], the outcomes are random and have a
probability density function (PDF) pM (xM ), which is
Gaussian and centred at zero with variance σ2M , given by
pM (xM ) =
1√
2πσ2M
exp
(
−xM
2
2σ2M
)
. (15)
In practice, the measurement results may not totally
originate from the measurements of quantum sources,
and some classical noises like the electrical noise will in-
evitably contribute to the measurement results. To avoid
the effects of classical noises and extract randomness in-
dependent to classical side information, the influences of
classical noises on the minimum entropy need to be char-
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FIG. 2. (Color online) The random-to-total bits ratio vs. the
number of truncated bits after using them-LSBs postprocess-
ing method under the trusted source assumption. Different
classical noise levels are considered. From top to bottom, the
standard deviations of classical noises are 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 10 and
100 times than that of the quantum signals.
5acterized [25, 29, 59]. The measured signal M is then
written as M = Q + E and the resulting measurement
PDF pM is a convolution of pQ and pE , where pQ and
pE denote the PDF of the quantum signal and the clas-
sical noises, respectively. To extract randomness inde-
pendent of classical noises, the conditional PDF between
the measured signal and the classical noises need to be
considered, which is given by [29, 59]
pM|E (xM |e) =
1√
2π (σ2M − σ2E)
exp
[
− (xM − e)
2
2 (σ2M − σ2E)
]
=
1√
2πσ2Q
exp
[
− (xM − e)
2
2σ2Q
]
, (16)
where σ2E is the variance of classical noises and e is the
influence of classical noises on the measured data. After
discretizing the raw data and performing the m-LSBs
operation, the conditional probability distribution of the
final output sequences under the condition of classical
noises is the integrals in each intervals {Γj}, given by
PrM|E
(
xjM |e
)
=
∫
Γj
dxmpM|E (xM |e) . (17)
Therefore, the worst-case min-entropy conditioned on
classical side-information E can be defined to described
the lower bound of the randomness of the source, which
is given by
H∞(xM |E)=−log2
(
max
e∈R
max
j∈[0,2m−1]
PrM|E
(
xjM |e
))
.
(18)
Here we assume that the classical noises are well-
characterized and independent to the quantum signal
[25, 59], which is reasonable for the trusted source sce-
nario. For practical purposes, we bound the maximum
excursion of e as −12σE ≤ e ≤ 12σE , which is valid with
the probability greater than 99.99%.
We exploit the random-to-total bits ratio (RTBR)
R = H∞ (xM |E)/m to quantify the randomness of the
final sequences after the m-LSBs operation. Noting that
we can also define the statistical distance between two
probability distributions X and Y to measure the dis-
tance of final data’s distribution from the uniformly dis-
tributed numbers [6], but we think the RTBR is more
intuitive in the m-LSBs scenarios. If R = 1, it means
that the min-entropy is equal to the Shannon entropy
(with very small probability of differences) and all the
remaining bits can be used for generating random num-
bers.
Supposing that the ADC has 16-bits resolution, we plot
the relations between the number of truncated bits and
the RTBRs under different classical noise levels, which
are shown in Fig.2. It can be seen that the min-entropy
cannot reach the maximum value (corresponding to the
RTBR closing to 1) without postprocessing, and even
there is no classical noises. This is the direct evidence
that the random number is not a uniform distribution
after the measurement step. Intuitively, the simple post-
processing method like the m-LSBs operation can “uni-
form” measurement results. We should note that this
kind of postprocessing method cannot raise the total ran-
domness in the entropy source, but can only increase the
proportion of random bits after processing, and “worse”
sources mean “more” truncated bits are needed to ex-
tract more randomness. Moreover, even though the
classical noise is much larger than the quantum signal
(σE ∼ 100σQ), the RTBR can still close to 1 after dis-
carding several bits. This postprocessing method is very
practical in the case of the trusted source scenario, since
we do not need to exploit the extractors like Toeplitz-
hashing extractor to extract randomness, which is com-
plicated especially in real-time hardware implementa-
tions.
IV. UNTRUSTED SOURCE SCENARIO
In the untrusted source scenario, it is always as-
sumed that the source devices are not perfect and ill-
characterized, and all the technical noises have to be at-
tributed to the malicious adversaries and thus cannot be
trusted [5]. Hence, the quantum side information E for
guessing the random sequencesXm−LSBs needs to be con-
sidered after them-LSBs operation, which could be quan-
tified by the conditional min-entropy H∞ (Xm−LSBs|E).
The EUR is an effective tool for the conditional min-
entropy estimation considered in the SDI-QRNG scenar-
ios [45, 46], assuming with trusted measurement devices
and a totally untrusted source. In this section, we con-
struct a new continuous variable EUR with the m-LSBs
operators to bound the conditional quantum min-entropy
by randomly switching between two measurement bases.
The SDI-QRNG scenario with the m-LSBs operations
is shown in Fig.3. One (Alice) in the lab holds an un-
trusted and uncharacterized source treated as a black
box, where a potential adversary (Eve) may has access
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FIG. 3. (Color online) The structure of the SDI-QRNG with
them-LSBs operations. An energy test is performed to bound
the energy of modes XET and PET by a heterodyne detector,
which are splitted from the source by a beam splitter with
transmittance T . a and b are two vacuum states induced by
beam splitters. HD denotes the homodyne detector.
6to a quantum system E correlated with the source. Since
the intervals I0 and I2L+1 are with infinite length, any
uncertainty relations will get trivial bounds within these
intervals.
To solve this problem, we use the energy test T (M,T )
[60] to check whether the probabilities of these two in-
tervals are small, in order to ensure that the purified dis-
tance between ρX˜E and ρXE is small enough, where X˜
can be obtained by measuring the amplitudes or phases
of the untrusted states according to intervals
{
I˜k
}
. Alice
uses an unbalanced beam splitter with transmissivity T
to split the source into two path. The transmission path
is exploited for generating random numbers and the re-
flection path is used for monitoring the energy of the
incoming signals. A heterodyne detection is employed
to check if |XET | , |PET | ≤ M is satisfied for all of the
input signals and aborts the QRNG process otherwise.
The upper bound of the probability that Alice measures
with homodyne detection larger than α can be bounded
by the function Γ (α, T,M), given by
Γ(α, T,M) :=
√
1+λ+
√
1+λ−1
2
exp
(
− (µα−M)
2
T (1+λ) /2
)
,
(19)
where µ =
√
1−T
2T and λ =
(
2T−1
T
)2
. The smoothness of
the energy test ǫ˜ further can be written as
ǫ˜ =
√
2nΓ (α, T,M)
ppass
. (20)
Alice then randomly measures the quadrature X or
the quadrature P of the incoming signals with practical
homodyne detection in many runs. The practical homo-
dyne detector in this scenario is assumed to be trusted
modeled by an ideal homodyne detector followed by a
practical ADC. After Alice gets enough data, the pro-
tocol turns to the postprocessing process. The m-LSBs
operation for X resulting data Xm−LSBs is used for ran-
dom bits generation and the s-LSBs operation for P re-
sulting data Ps−LSBs is exploited for the entropy estima-
tion. The smooth min-entropy Hǫ∞ (Xm−LSBs|E) can be
bounded with the help of the EUR, which is given by
Hǫ∞(Xm−LSBs|E)≥−log2 (cLSBs)−Hmax (Ps−LSBs) ,
(21)
where ǫ ≤ (ǫ1 − ǫs)/(2ppass)− 2ǫ˜ [56], and cLSBs denotes
the maximum overlap between operators Mˆ jm−LSBs,δx
and Nˆ js−LSBs,δp , which reads
cLSBs = sup
i,j
∥∥∥∥
√
Mˆ im−LSBs,δx
√
Nˆ js−LSBs,δp
∥∥∥∥
2
, (22)
where ‖·‖ denotes the operator norm (i.e., the maximal
singular value). For simplicity, we first consider the over-
lap term of the differential entropy, which satisfies
c∞ = lim inf
δx,δp→0
[
cLSBs
δxδp
]
= sup
i,j
lim inf
δx,δp→0
[
1
δxδp
∥∥∥∥
√
Mˆ im−LSBs,δx
√
Nˆ js−LSBs,δp
∥∥∥∥
2
]
= sup
i,j
lim inf
δx,δp→0
∥∥∥∥∥∥
√
Mˆ im−LSBs,δx
δx
√
Nˆ js−LSBs,δp
δp
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
= sup
i,j
∥∥∥Mˆ im−LSBs,∞Nˆ js−LSBs,∞∥∥∥2, (23)
where (i ∈ [0, 2m − 1], j ∈ [0, 2s − 1])
Mˆ im−LSBs,∞ = lim
δx→0
(
1
δx
Mˆ im−LSBs,δx
)
=
2L−m−1∑
k=0
|(i+ 2mk) δx〉x〈(i + 2mk) δx|x
Nˆ js−LSBs,∞ = lim
δp→0
(
1
δp
Nˆ js−LSBs,δp
)
=
2N−s−1∑
k=0
|(j + 2sk) δp〉p〈(j + 2sk) δp|p.
(24)
The overlap of the two LSBs operators in Eq.(22) can be
well approximated by the relation cLSBs ≈ c∞ · δx · δp.
To bound the overlap term c∞, we first define
Uj,k : =
∥∥∥Mˆ jm−LSBs,∞Nˆks−LSBs,∞∥∥∥
= max
ψ
(
〈ψ| Mˆ jm−LSBs,∞Nˆks−LSBs,∞ |ψ〉
)
, (25)
where ψ is an arbitrary wave function. Because the mod-
ular square of arbitrary wave functions is not greater than
1, we can easily bound Uj,k by
|Uj,k|≤
2L−m−1∑
g=0
2N−s−1∑
t=0
1√
2π~
exp
(
i (j+2mg) (k+2st) δxδp
~
)
,
(26)
and then c∞ = sup
j,k
|Uj,k|2 can be obtained.
We plot the relations between extracted random bits
(entropy) and the resolutions of ADCs in the SDI-QRNG
scenario as shown in Fig.4. We only consider the asymp-
totic regime in our paper, for the finite-size effect can
be easily introduced by the smooth min-entropy, which
has already discussed in Ref.[46]. Both vacuum states
(solid lines) and thermal states (dashed lines) as the ran-
domness sources are displayed. We discuss the perfor-
mances of the SDI-QRNGs with three different m-LSBs
postprocessing methods, which can be applied to all en-
tropy sources: (1) the most common SDI-QRNG condi-
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Entropy evaluation results in SDI-
QRNG with LSBs operation. We show the entropy extraction
both in vacuum-state (solid lines) and thermal-state (dashed
lines) source under different ADC Resolutions. Xm−LSBs and
Ps−LSBs denote that m− LSBs and s − LSBs operations are
used for processing of data X and P respectively. Both m
and s are chosen as ADC resolution minus one bit.
tion, which has been discussed in Ref.[46], and no m-
LSBs operation is used for processing data X and data
P . (2) the m-LSBs operation is performed for process-
ing data X (X is used for generating random bits in the
SDI-QRNG) and has no operation for data P (P is used
for the entropy estimation in the SDI-QRNG). (3) the m-
LSBs operation is performed for processing data X and
the s-LSBs operation is used for operating data P . Both
m-LSBs and s-LSBs operations are chosen to discard the
MSB of the data and keep the rest bits in our discus-
sions. It is shown that, whether the LSBs operations are
performed on the checking data or the raw random num-
bers, discarding one per bit of data will lose two bits of
the final secure random numbers.
It is intuitive that them-LSBs operation has no contri-
bution to distill quantum randomness in the SDI-QRNG
scenario. The reason is that the EUR is a relative tight
bound for estimating randomness of the entropy sources,
which can extract secure random bits out of the potential
quantum side information without extra classical post-
processing operations.
V. DISCUSSION
Let’s investigate why such deterministic operations like
the m-LSBs operation are not helpful for the randomness
extraction when there exists quantum side information.
Assuming X : ={0, 1}L be the random number space
before the post-processing perfermed, and the output
random number x takes values in this set. Considering
that X may be correlated to a quantum system E, which
is accessible to a potential Eve, and for every possible
outcome X = x, Eve holds a state ρxE . The joint state of
X and E can then be described as a classical-quantum
state (cq-state), which is given by
ρXE =
∑
x∈X
PX (x) |x〉 〈x| ⊗ ρxE , (27)
where we use the orthogonal basis {|x〉}x∈X to represent
the family of classical random numbers x, and PX (x) is
the probability that X = x. The maximum probability
of guessing X given E can be defined by pguess (ρXE |E),
namely,
pguess (ρXE |E) := sup
{Mx}
∑
x∈X
PX (x) Tr (ρ
x
EMx) , (28)
where the supreme is taken over all the POVMs {Mx}x∈X
on E, and the min-entropy condition on Eve’s auxiliary
system is defined as
Hmin (ρXE |E) = −log2pguess (ρXE |E) . (29)
Now if Alice processes her random numbers by a
mapping-type operation, which can map date from a
large data set to a smaller one, this is equivalent to apply-
ing a deterministic classical operation Nˆ to the cq-state,
namely, Nˆ = Nˆx ⊗ IE . More specifically, the operation
Nˆ is acting on the classical part of the cq-state and can-
not change the quantum part held by eavesdroppers. As
mentioned above, such a “mapping” operation is a selec-
tive combination of the discrete intervals. For instance, if
Alice exploits the m-LSBs operation to perform random-
ness extraction, the random number space after postpro-
cessing becomes Y : ={0, 1}m. Assuming that the classi-
cal values y∈ Y are the outcomes after post-processing,
which are denoted by the orthogonal basis {|y〉}y∈Y . The
cq-state ρY E after the postprocessing process should sat-
isfies
ρY E =
∑
y∈Y
PY (y) |y〉 〈y| ⊗ ρyE . (30)
This is because the classical operation Nˆ Alice exploited
will not affect Eve’s hidden systems, and Eve will always
get the quantum state ρyE by recombining some of his
original auxiliary systems ρxE . Here we assume that Eve
fully knows the deterministic operation performed on Al-
ice’s side.
Then it is important to know the guessing probabil-
ity pguess (ρY E |E) after post-processing process, which
is given by
pguess (ρY E |E) := sup
{My}
∑
y∈Y
PY (y)Tr (ρ
y
EMy) , (31)
where the supreme is taken over all the POVMs {My}y∈Y
on E. Noticing that the guessing probability in Eq.(31)
8differs from that before postprocessing in two places. One
is the classical probabilities PY (y) and PX (x), and the
other is the probabilities that Eve implements the op-
timal measurements to get the results y or x, which are
denoted by Tr (ρyEMy) and Tr (ρ
x
EMx), respectively. The
classical probability PY (y) is the summation of some
of the probabilities PX (x) by recombining the measure-
ment intervals, which means that the probability PY (y)
is greater than PX (x). The term Tr (ρ
y
EMy) in Eq.(31) is
not smaller than the original term Tr (ρxEMx) in Eq.(28)
owning to the fact that Eve can also get more knowledge
by measuring auxiliary systems ρyE rather than ρ
x
E .
Consequently, it is easy to prove that the relation
pguess (ρY E |E) ≥ pguess (ρXE |E) always holds and the
min-entropy condition on E will not be increased after
the deterministic “mapping” operation.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented an analysis of the m-LSBs postpro-
cessing operation in QRNGs. The newm-LSBs operators
have been constructed by regrouping the coarse-grained
measurement intervals. We also applied the m-LSBs
operators to both trusted source and untrusted source
scenarios. The trusted source scenario was analyzed by
the worst-case min-entropy conditioned on classical side-
information, while the EUR was exploited to study the
untrusted source scenario. We find that the m-LSBs op-
eration can be exploited as an effective randomness ex-
tractor in the case of trusted sources, but not in the case
of untrusted sources. We believe that the m-LSBs opera-
tion can be used as a candidate of randomness extractors
for real-time hardware implementations, especially in the
trusted-device scenarios.
We note that our method of constructing the m-LSBs
operators can also be applied to the other types of simple
postprocessing methods, such as exclusive-OR operations
and the von Neumann debiasing method. The key point
is to find the “data mapping table” before and after data
processing. An interesting extension of this paper would
be to further study other simple postprocessing methods
by suitable recombining the coarse-grained measurement
intervals.
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